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Big Picture, Fine Print:
The Intersection of Art and Tax
Anne-Marie E. Rhodes*
All passes. Art alone
Enduring stays with us.
The world of art and the world of income tax appear to be polar opposites. A
work of art at its best is dazzlingly original and heartstoppingly thought provoking,
while an income tax return is not. Nothing more than a standard-issue 1040 form
with a straightforward, even somnolent, acceptance is the filing goal. Yet these
worlds co-exist and, of necessity, routinely intersect. In that annual crossing, one
wonders if the shape of one world is influenced by the other. At its core, is the
question: Is art given special treatment in the Internal Revenue Code? It is, and this
Article discusses this income tax question primarily from the perspective of an
individual collector making a disposition of an artwork.
I. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING WORKS OF ART
There are two big picture themes in art that require a brief introduction. The
first is art as "cultural property," a term that through various international treaties,
U.N. Conventions, and domestic laws may well be emerging as a distinct type of
property within our legal system, and others as well. This theme is of art at its
best-a creative ennobling testament to the human spirit. The second theme is
decidedly less ennobling (one might fairly call it the underbelly of the art world)
and that is the illicit trade in art. This illicit trade involves stolen, smuggled, and
forged or fraudulent works of art.
A. CULTURAL PROPERTY AS A NEW TYPE OF PROPERTY
When experienced American lawyers think of property in our legal tradition,
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A. 1973, Albertus Magnus
College; J.D. 1976, Harvard University. A work in progress version of this Article was presented to the
Federal Taxation Committee of the Chicago Bar on April 23, 2002. Helpful commentary from that
audience, colleagues, and as always David W. Hepplewhite, has clarified and improved the final
version. Any mistakes, omissions, and errors in judgment are mine alone.
© 2003 by Anne-Marie E. Rhodes.
1. HENRY AUSTIN DOBSON, Ars Victrix, stanza 8, in THE COMPLETE POETIC WORKS 141, 142
(Oxford U. Press 1923).
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Blackacre with its bundle of rights looms large. 2 First year property courses focus
extensively on real property, 3 with students often reciting dutifully that it is the
uniqueness and permanence of Blackacre that require the application of highly
developed legal rules to it. Some lesser amount of classroom time is generally
allotted to discussions of the non-real property-personal property-in those
property courses. 4  The discussions on personal property sometimes have the
quality of a bas-relief--our student understanding of personal property is based not
on personal property's intrinsic merits but rather on its contrasts or overlaps with
real property. In other words, how personal property is the same as real property,
and how it differs or thrusts apart from real property. The differences are often due
to the fungible and moveable nature of personal property as opposed to the
uniqueness and permanence of Blackacre. If the property professor really manages
her time well, there might be some mention of intangible property (today read as
intellectual property) as an emerging third category to be studied as an elective. 5
Today, of course, intellectual property is well ensconced in the academic world
and in the real world. Questions of law and technology challenge our legal system,
and new rules are being discussed, developed, and tried out on a global scale.
6
Now there is, perhaps, a new emerging fourth category or "estate" of property-
that of cultural property. 7 For the purposes of this Article, cultural property refers
2. "Blackacre is the most celebrated tract of land in the world of the law .... JOHN E.
CRIBBETT, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 1 (1st ed. 1962).
3. See, e.g., JOHN E. CRIBBETr ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY (8th
ed. 2002); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (5th ed. 2002); JOSEPH W. SINGER,
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES (3d ed. 2002).
4. "Basically, this is a book on the law of land and personal property is treated only incidentally to
illuminate certain property principles, such as the nature of gifts and the importance of possession."
JOHN E. CRIBBETT, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, at viii (lst ed. 1962); cf JOHN E. CRIBBErT
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY, at v (8th ed. 2002). "This edition retains
and updates its substantial coverage of personal property, which has been popular with many users of
prior editions." Of 1253 pages, about 100 pages (pp. 83-181) are focused on personal property.
5. See, e.g., EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW, at v (4th
ed. 2000) ("[T]his fourth edition emphasizes two other dimensions of property law. First, this edition
provides a comprehensive introduction to Intellectual Property Law"); JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY
LAW: RULES, POLICIES & PROCEDURES, at xliii (3d ed. 2002) ("There has been a surge of interest
among some property law professors in introducing some aspects of intellectual property into the first-
year course. This trend is especially evident among new teachers in the field .... There has always
been a subset of intellectual property in this and other casebooks."). Also GRANT S. NELSON ET AL.,
CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY, at vi (2d ed. 2002) ("We are especially happy... [to have] added an
entirely new chapter on ... intellectual property law.")
6. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Attacking the Copyright Evildoers in Cyberspace, 55 SMU L. REV.
1561(2002); CYNTHIA M. HO, International Intellectual Property Issues for Biotechnology, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 761 (2000).
7. Other phrases are also being used today, such as cultural heritage; however, because of the
narrow technical focus here (generally on the dispositions of property, whether charitable or not), the
phrase "cultural property" seems more appropriate. See Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick O'Keefe, "Cultural
Property" or "Cultural Heritage," 1 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307, 312-19 (1992). The estates
currently recognized are the first estate of real property; the second estate of movables or chattel; and the
third estate of intangible property, including the intellectual property in copyright, trademark, rights of
publicity, and patent.
[26:2
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to items of artistic, archeological, ethnological or historical interest.8 There is
ongoing global pressure to preserve cultural property as important for humankind. 9
Recall the worldwide outcry over the Taliban's 2001 destruction of the ancient
Buddha statues in Afghanistan.10 There is also a growing scholarship on the need
to treat cultural property differently from other types of personal property. I I
Whether a true fourth estate of cultural property will be acknowledged and
recognized within the American legal system remains an open question. The
practical issue for a lawyer with a client owner of an item of cultural property (or
that could become an item of cultural property) will be understanding the contours
of the client's proprietary rights. Important questions include: What ownership
rights does the client actually acquire? What does ownership of the item of cultural
property allow and disallow? How does one transfer or dispose of whatever it is
that the client has? Over time the American legal system will undoubtedly respond
to this big picture theme since it challenges our current concepts about ownership
of property that may be deemed to have unique cultural value.
12
The relationship between cultural property and the Internal Revenue Code is not
8. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, 242 (hereinafter Hague Convention). Its Article I definition speaks of cultural
property as "moveable or immoveable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every
people, such as... works of art."
Professor John Henry Merryman noted, "[T]he entire question of the proper definition of cultural
property for legal and policy purposes is a large and unruly one .... " John Henry Merryman, Two
Ways ofThinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 831, 831 n.1 (1986).
9. Hague Convention, supra note 8. See also UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970), 823 U.N.T.S. 231; see
also UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322.
Today there is a debate concerning the meaning of ownership and belonging of cultural property,
especially when repatriation of cultural property is at issue. The principal opposing views are generally
referred to as "cultural internationalism" and "cultural nationalism." Professor John Henry Merryman is
often associated with the arguments based on cultural internationalism. See, e.g., John Henry
Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1986), and John
Henry Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1881 (1985); cf David
Rudenstine, The Rightness and Utility of Voluntary Repatriation, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 69
(2001). See also Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation, and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 291, 302
(1999) (proposing a different approach-to seek the "normative similarities in our attitudes toward
cultural heritage and to search for a common, non-rights and non-instrumental based understanding of
its significance").
10. E.g., U.N. Pleads With Taliban Not to Destroy Buddha Statues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at
A3; Berry Bearak, Over World Protests, Taliban Are Destroying Ancient Buddhas, N.Y. TIMES, MAR. 4,
2001, § 1, at 10. There still may be at least one Buddha remaining. Liz Sly, Tale of Sleeping Buddha
Stirs inside Afghanistan, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 2002, § 1, at 1.
11. E.g., Richard Crewdsin, Cultural Property as the Fourth Estate?, 81 L. Soc'Y GAZETTE 126,
129 (1984); Steven Wilf, What Is Property's Fourth Estate? Cultural Property and the Fiduciary Ideal,
16 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 177 (2001); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Four Questions About Art, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 119 (1994) ("Why do we treat art in our legal culture like nonart?").
12. Wilf, supra note 11, at 182. ("But we do not always know where that interest lies-and, in
fact, there may be competing public interests as well as private interests. The fiduciaries envisioned...
create competing claims.... Cultural property's fiduciary ideal, then, is complex and rarely a question
of vesting one bundle of rights upon one party.")
2003]
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always clear. Positioning cultural property as the fourth estate has enormous
conceptual implications as it represents a fundamental shift in our legal notion of
ownership. As such, the Code is not the place we would expect to find a
pioneering spirit, and we do not. The Code is the fine print for this theme,
nevertheless Code sections may evolve over time if art as cultural property
becomes accepted. Looking closely, even now there is evidence of the Code's
reacting to changes in art law. One ready example is the addition of section
2055(e)(4) and section 2522(c)(3) to the Code by ERTA number '81,13 changes
necessitated by the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976.14 These two sections
provide that for certain works of art, the work of art and the copyright on the work
of art shall be treated as two separate properties for the split interest rules for estate
and gift tax purposes and not as two interests in one property as previously held. It
is particularly interesting to note that changes in property's third estate, as it were,
prompted this revision in the Code.
Whether a fourth estate will exist, and what its bundle of rights will be, makes
predictions of future Code changes impressionistic at best.'5 Given the Code's
thematic property touchstones of ownership, dominion, and control,"6 the scope and
shape of future Code changes in response to a cultural property category would
likely be directly proportional to changes in the proprietary meanings of ownership,
dominion, and control for an item of cultural property.
B. ILLICIT ART TRADE
The second big picture theme is quite gritty and much less ennobling-the world
of the illicit art trade, involving stolen, smuggled, and forged or fraudulent works
of art. 17 This art market is not always genteel or refined-murder, assault, and
kidnapping have happened. 18  It ranks third in international criminal activity. 19
13. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA '81), Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 423, adding §
2055(e)(4) and § 2522(c)(3) (1981).
14. 17 U.SC. § 202 (1976). The Copyright Act of 1976 made sweeping changes to domestic
copyright law. See Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
856 (1978).
15. On the transfer tax side, one possible change could be the U.S. adoption of a dation en
paiement provision, i.e. using art of the highest stature instead of dollars in payment of the tax. The
French tax system provides for this, and one sterling consequence is the Picasso Museum in Paris.
Safeguards concerning the process as well as the stature of the work of art need to be part of any
proposal. See Anne-Marie Rhodes, The Medium of Payment: An Option in Estate Tax Reform, 57
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 285 (1981).
16. E.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940): "In this case we cannot conclude...
that respondent ceased to be the owner of the corpus after the trust was created .... So far as his
dominion and control were concerned it seems clear that the trust did not effect any substantial
change ......
17. The late Professor Paul Bator raised the level of discussion about this market in his seminal
article, Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275 (1982).
18. In Search of Stolen Art, on-line discussion Aug. 10, 2000, transcript available at
http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/00/fbi08I0.htm, cited in Patty Gerstenblith, The
Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural Objects, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 197, 202 n.16 (2001). For
interesting articles on looting, see RICHARD B. CUNNINGHAM, ARCHEOLOGY, RELICS, AND THE LAW
[26:2
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From the monetary perspective, this market is a thriving one, estimated well into
the billions of dollars annually and is regarded as the easiest way to launder money
internationally. 20 It is a market said to be fueled by the spiraling prices for works
of art, aggressive practices of auction houses, the collapse of Communism and
corresponding rise of organized crime in Eastern Europe, grinding poverty in art
rich countries, insatiable demand in art poor countries, lax enforcement of
international and domestic laws, 21 and, some would argue, the Internal Revenue
Code. 22  "[The] use of art investments as tax shelters is a prime factor for the
flourishing illicit trade in stolen or counterfeit art." 23 "Tax shelter," as so used,
seems to mean receiving a deduction for a charitable donation, usually at an
inappropriately inflated value, 24 and not what tax lawyers today would generally
consider a tax shelter. 25  There is also an international perception, noted by
14-36 (1999).
19. It is obviously difficult to know the actual size of any illicit trade. Respected estimates
confirm that the illicit art trade is substantial. See Hugh Eakin, The World's Top Art Cop, ARTNEwS
158, 160 (Summer 2002) ("According to insurance estimates, the worldwide trade in stolen art and
antiquities is now worth $6 billion to $7 billion a year-a number surpassed on the black market only by
drugs and armaments."). See also Steven Bibas, The Case Against Statutes of Limitation for Stolen Art,
103 YALE L.J. 2437, 2452 (1994). ("As of 1990, art theft was second only to drug smuggling as the
most lucrative crime in the world.")
20. Eakin, supra note 19, at 160, quoting General Roberto Conforti, head of Italy's Conando
Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Artistico (Carabinieri Command for the Preservation of Cultural
Heritage) ("Fine art is a vehicle for organized crime. Mobsters use cultural goods for money laundering
or investments. On many occasions a work of art is used to back a drug deal.") See also Gerstenblith,
supra note 18, at 202 n.16.
21. Adina Kurjatko, Are Finders Keepers? The Need for a Uniform Law Governing the Rights of
Original Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 59, 60-61
(1999). But for an account of a recent sting operation with international cooperation, see Ralph
Blumenthal, Spanish Police and F.B.I. Get Their Men and Stolen Art, N. Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at
El. For a description of the large scale Italian art police, see Eakin, supra note 19. General Conforti has
stressed the need for international cooperation, noting that "the abolition of frontiers (in Europe) has
favored illicit trade .... We depend on the concept of co-operation, it is the only way to deal with the
globalisation of this phenomenon." UNESCO Press, Launch of Code of Ethics for Art Dealers at
Anniversary Celebration of Ending Illicit Trade in Cultural Property, (Nov. 16, 2000), available at
http://www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/2000/00-119e-shtml.
22. Leah Antonio, The Current Status of the International Art Trade, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 51 (1986).
23. Id. at 58.
24. STAFF OF THE JT. COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 (H.R. 4170, 98th Congress; Pub. L. No. 98-369), at 503 (1984):
At the same time, Congress recognized that in recent years, opportunities to offset income
through inflated valuations of donated property have been increasingly exploited by tax shelter
promoters. Under typical tax shelter promotions, individuals acquire objects such as limited
edition lithographs, books, gems, and the like, hold the property for at least the capital gains
holding period, and then contribute the items to a museum ... at their "appreciated" fair market
value. The shelter package may include an "independent" appraisal, and the potential donor may
be assured that his or her subsequent gift will be accepted by a charitable organization.
Id. See also LEONARD D. DU BOFF & SALLY HOLT CAPLAN, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW N-85-88 (2d
ed. 1997).
25. I.R.C. § 6111 (c) (2003). Actually, some very well respected tax lawyers in the past would not
have considered it a tax shelter either: "Such schemes are often referred to in the media as exotic tax
shelters, but we call them what they really are-abusive. These schemes claim tax benefits beyond
2003)
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Europeans in particular, that American tax policy in providing for a charitable
deduction has caused an unwarranted rise in prices that has subsequently placed the
rest of the art world at a competitive disadvantage.
26
Thus this second theme of the illicit art market is not really as elusive vis-a-vis
the Code as the first theme of cultural property. Indeed, in the Code there are direct
and indirect references to works of art that respond to elements of this illicit
market. Many of these references are in the context of making dispositions of
artworks, often to charities.
II. DISPOSITIONS OF ART
A. SALES
As background for considering the tax implications for dispositions of art, recall
the basics. Gross income includes gains derived from dealings in property.27 Gain
is the excess of amount realized over adjusted basis.28  The preferential capital
gains tax rates29 are generally applicable to sales of capital assets held for more
than one year.30  Although the typical capital gains rate is 20%, a 28% rate is
applied to collectibles.3 1
Under § 1 (h)(6)(A), "collectibles gain" is defined as, "gain ... from the sale or
exchange of a collectible (as defined in § 408(m) without regard to paragraph (3)
those intended by law and, in some cases, cross the boundary of tax avoidance into tax evasion." IRS
Commissioner Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Defusing Abusive Tax Shelters, HEART AM. TAX INST., Kansas
City, Mo. (Oct. 6, 1981), reprinted in full, 13 TAX NOTES 863 (Oct. 12, 1981).
26. Antonio, supra note 22, at 58.
27. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3).
28. IR.C. § 1001(a).
29. LR.C. § 1(h). From the Revenue Act of 1921 until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the taxation
of capital gains received favorable tax treatment, whether through the mechanism of a stated maximum
rate or a percentage of gain deduction. With TRA '86, 65 years of preferential tax treatment was
abolished; but after a particularly bruising political battle in 1989, the capital gains preference resurfaced
in 1990. Its reappearance was indirect because "Congress, with President George Bush's acquiescence,
raised the top individual permanent rate on ordinary income to 31% in 1990 while maintaining the 28%
ceiling on capital gains. This had the effect of restoring a capital gains preference." John W. Lee,
Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 VA. TAX REV. 1, 2 (1995). A
thorough discussion of the taxation of capital gains is beyond the scope of this article, but for the classic
presentation of the arguments for and against, see Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital
Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957). For more recent scholarship, see articles from the May 1993
New York University Colloquium on Capital Gains, collected at 48 TAX L. REv. 312-738 (1993).
30. I.R.C. § 1222; see William M. Speiller, The Favored Tax Treatment of Purchasers of Art, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 214, 251 (1980).
31. I.R.C. § l(h)(6)(a) (2003) The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 31 1(a),
amending I.R.C. § 1(h) (2003), generally lowered the maximum long term capital gains rate for
individuals from 28% to 20%. For "collectible gains," however, the top rate "will remain" at 28%. See
Brian R. Greenstein, The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997-Provisions Affecting Individuals, 87 J. TAX'N
261, 264 (Nov. 1997). Instinctively, many people think of 20% as the current capital gains rate, or
perhaps as the maximum capital gains rate. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, A New Round
of Tax Cuts?, 96 TAX NOTES 1397, 1398 n.8 (Sept. 2, 2002).
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thereof) which is a capital asset held for more than one year but only to the extent
such gain is taken into account in computing gross income."
32
Under § 408(m)(2), the term "collectible" means:
(A) any work of art,
(B) any rug or antique,
(C) any metal or gem,
(D) any stamp or coins,
(E) any alcoholic beverage, or
(F) any other tangible personal property specified by the Secretary for
purposes of this subsection.
33
Thus, a sale of $11,000 worth of stock held for three years with a basis of
$1,000 would generate a maximum tax of $2,000, whereas a similar sale of a work
of art would generate a maximum tax of $2,800 (a potential 40% differential in tax
treatment).
There is little direct legislative history for this 1997 enactment of distinctive
treatment in the capital gains rates for works of art,34 although the idea of
distinctive treatment for collectibles was not totally new. Its origins can be traced
back at least to 1989 when President Bush unsuccessfully proposed to reintroduce a
capital gains preference. 35  His proposal specifically carved out depreciable and
depletable assets and collectibles from the preferential treatment, "since realizations
on excluded assets are relatively insensitive to change in tax rates" and
consequently would not further the "Administration's goal of reducing the Code's
role in influencing economic decisions." 36  In the 1997 enactment of this new
32. I.R.C. § l(h)(6)(A).
33. I.R.C. § 408(m)(2).
34. STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS, 105TH CONG., COMM. REPORT ON TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT
OF 1997 (H.R. 2014), § 311, at 64 (1997).
35. President Bush's unsuccessful 1989 proposal was built on his campaign issue of reintroducing
preferential tax treatment for capital gains, which had been effectively abolished by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. See supra note 29. His plan was twofold: first, to exclude 45% of the gain realized on the
disposition of qualified capital assets and, second, to set a 15% maximum tax rate on realized capital
gains. The maximum effective rate therefore would be 8.25%. Ian K. Louden & R. Eliot Rosen, The
Bush Budget: Chock Full of Tax Changes, 42 TAX NOTES 766 (Feb. 13, 1989).
36. Pat Jones writes:
Conspicuously absent from the list of capital assets benefiting from the reduced rate are
depreciable assets and depletable assets and collectibles. Depletable assets include timber, a fact
not lost on [Sen. Bob] Packwood [R. Ore.], who used the Finance Committee hearing to give the
Administration a stem warning "I cannot accept that, period," he said, promising to block the
Bush proposal unless it is amended to include timber.
With timber still on his mind, Packwood questioned [Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary for
Tax Policy Dennis E.] Ross about Treasury's rationale for excluding some assets. Ross
responded that Treasury officials believe that realizations on excluded assets are relatively
insensitive to changes in tax rates. Thus, he said, the Administration's goal of reducing the
Code's role in influencing economic decisions would not be furthered by including these assets.
Pat Jones, Taxnvriters Look at Capital Gains,- Brad, Nixes Rate Trade, 42 TAX NOTES 1407, 1408 (Mar.
20, 1989).
Despite this professed goal of reducing the Code's influence, some saw this distinctive treatment for
2003]
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legislative category of "collectibles gain" for rate purposes, the House did not refer
to any particular rationale but merely concluded that "[t]he tax on the net capital
gain... of collectibles will remain at a maximum rate of 28 percent. ' 37 In doing
so, however, it did reference an established tax tradition for a "collectible." 38
Section 408(m)(1) provides that an IRA that purchases a "collectible" is treated
as if the IRA had made a distribution of the fair market value of the collectible to
the IRA participant. In effect, this constructive distribution removes the tax
advantages of an IRA for this type of property but does not prohibit investments in
collectibles. ERTA '81 added this constructive distribution treatment because:
collectibles in a manner reminiscent of prior debates: "Collectibles are excluded, and we applaud the
Administration's goal of forestalling tax sheltering." Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield, The
Case for the Restoration of a Capital Gains Tax Differential, 43 TAX NOTES 1019 (May 22, 1989). If
the Administration's goal was to move toward limiting capital gains treatment to corporate stock, on the
other hand, "the principle difficulty with a proposal applied only to capital stock is that it does nothing
about the problem of inflation." Gene Steurle, More Capital Gains Issues, 43 TAX NOTES 1533 (June
19, 1989).
The 1989 Bush proposal was defeated, but interestingly, other legislative proposals on capital gains
picked up on the collectibles exclusion. For example, the also-unsuccessful 1989 bipartisan efforts of
Representatives Jenkins, Archer, and Flippo on capital gains would also have excluded collectibles.
"Almost all capital assets are covered under the JAF, though collectibles (art, stamps, and the like) are
excluded." J. Andrew Hoerner, Rumors and Opinions Fly on Competing Capital Gains Plans, 44 TAX
NOTES 839 (Aug. 21, 1989).
In 1990, President Bush advanced his new capital gains proposal, which incorporated a sliding rate
of tax depending on the length of the holding period and which still held onto a collectibles carve out
from the preference. Under that proposal, if one sold qualified capital assets that had been held for 3 or
more years, the exclusion was 30% of the gain. The exclusion rate dropped to 20% for assets held for 2-
3 years, and further dropped to 10% for assets held 1-2 years. "Basically, a qualified asset would
generally be defined as any asset qualifying as a capital asset under current law and satisfying the
holding period requirements, except for collectibles." Ian K. Louden, No Tax Surprises in '91 Budget
As Bush Seeks Capital Gains Cut, Family Savings Initiatives, 46 TAX NOTES 607 (Feb. 5, 1990).
President Bush's 1990 plan was not adopted.
37. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, supra note 29; H.R. REP. No. 105-220 at 382 (1997). The failure
to provide a rationale may be because there was no principled policy rationale for this solitary carve out,
rather just the back and forth of tax politics. A comparison of the 1997 capital gains provision in the
House, Senate, and President Clinton's tax proposals shows that both the Republican dominated House
and Senate lowered maximum capital gains rates in general while retaining the maximum 28% rate for
collectibles. Alternatively, Democratic President Clinton proposed a 30% exclusion for all capital gains
(with no mention of collectibles gain) with a special exclusion for gain up to $500,000 on the sale of a
principal residence. Martin A. Sullivan, Preliminarv Side-by-Side Comparison of House Bill, Senate
Bill, and Recent Proposals by the President, 76 TAX NOTES 16, 18 (July 7, 1997).
In conference and negotiations, the end result on capital gains was no percentage exclusion, up to
$500,000 exclusion of capital gains on the sale of a principal residence, and an exceedingly complex set
of lowered maximum capital gains tax rates except for collectibles, which stayed at 28%. Daniel Q.
Posin, The Big Bear: Calculating Capital Gains After 1997 Act, 76 TAX NOTES 1450 (Sept. 15, 1997).
Interestingly, two years previously, in the 1995 Republican Contract with America era, lowering
capital gains rates had been a significant element. At that time, however, the Republican plan did not
specifically carve out collectibles from the benefits of the proposal. For Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY),
this omission was not palatable. "We don't want people to laugh at this contract." Lee supra note 29, at
6 n.16.
As it turned out, none of the capital gains proposals, the omission of the collectible carve-out, or the
political disbelief mattered in 1995, since the capital gains proposal was not successful. The
significance of 1995 may be in foreshadowing the 1997 legislation on collectibles.
38. I.R.C. § l(h)(6)(A) expressly referencing §408(m).
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Congress concluded that investments in collectibles do not contribute to productive
capital formation. There was also concern that the present-law rules regarding self-
dealing under qualified plans and IRAs are not adequate to prevent personal use of
collectibles.
39
In short, the constant underlying disquiet about the potential for abuse of a tax
benefit because of the nature of art helped to shape the special IRA treatment in
1981, which, in turn, may very well also have shaped the distinctive capital gains
tax treatment in 1997.
B. LIFETIME CHARITABLE TRANSFERS OF ENTIRE INTEREST
For many taxpayers, it seems axiomatic that a gift to a charity entitles the donor
to an income tax charitable deduction. 40  Tax lawyers know that the charitable
deduction under § 170 is hedged with many limitations, both qualitative and
quantitative. These limitations are especially complex when a work of art is
involved.4'
In order to determine the availability and amount of a charitable deduction for a
transfer of a work of art for income tax purposes, the donor needs to know four
items:
(1) the status of the charitable organization;
(2) the type of property being transferred;
(3) whether that property meets the related use rule; and
(4) whether a qualified appraisal by a qualified appraiser is obtained.
39. STAFF OF THE JT. COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC
RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 (H.R. 4242, 97th Cong., Pub. L. No. 97-34), 212 (1981). The dual
concerns of lack of productive capital formation and potential for self-dealing reflect commentators'
concerns as well:
Growing concern with the problem of how to cope with inflation has recently led to increasing
recommendations that employee benefit funds should be invested in a variety of tangible
personal property: gold and silver bullion, rare coins, diamonds, Chinese porcelains, and other
works of art all have had their advocates. The hallmark of all these investments is of course that
they are non-income producing; their justification as an investment for an employee benefit plan
must be the expectation that the property can and eventually will be sold at a profit.
Inflation or no, investment managers should also be aware of the risks run by certain types of
conduct of being adjudged imprudent prima facia or per se, particularly with doctrines
embedded in private trust law and other non-ERISA rules. If we are to have a Federal law of
investment prudence in the employee benefit field, it is not asking too much of Congress to deal
with certain of these doctrines directly, either through express legislation or through express
delegation of rule-making authority.
Arthur D. Sporn, Prudent Investments for Today's Fiduciary, 38 NYU ANN. INST. FED. TAX (ERISA
SUPP.), at 3-23 to 3-24, 3-27 (1980).
40. I.R.C. § 170.
41. See RALPH LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS,
INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 1133-1422 (2d ed., 1998).
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1. Status of Charity
In general, charitable organizations are classified as either public charities or
private charities. 42 Public charities are those that receive part of their support from
the general public, and include churches, schools, hospitals, museums and other
publicly supported charities; private operating foundations; certain organizations
that are operated in connection with another public organization; as well as private
foundations that distribute all their receipts each year. Private charities include all
the other charities, including the usual private foundations. 43  The granting of
exempt status under § 501(c)(3) is not the same as a determination of "public"
status under § 509(a).44
The tax consequence for a donor of a work of art is, in general, the difference
between a charitable deduction limited to basis if the transfer is to a private charity
as opposed to a deduction of full fair market value if the transfer is to a public
charity.45 Because of this striking difference in the amount of the deduction, one
should consider requesting from the charity an opinion of counsel as to the
charity's "public" status.
2. Type of Property Donated
a. Capital Gain Property or Ordinary Income Property
The work of art will either be capital gain property or ordinary income property.
Under § 170(b)(1)(C)(iv), "capital gain property" means "any capital asset the sale
of which at its fair market value at the time of the contribution would have been
long-term capital gain.'4 6 Most works of art held by a collector could, therefore,
qualify as capital gain property.
47
Nevertheless, some works of art held by a collector would be considered as
ordinary income property (not qualify as capital gain property). These would
include works of art that:
1) would produce short-term capital gain if sold (i.e., held for less than
a year);
2) would produce a capital loss; or
3) had been acquired by the collector from the artist who created it (or
as a gift from someone else who so acquired it).
4
a
42. I.R.C. § 509(a); § 170(b)(l)(A)(i)-(vi), (E)(i)-(iii); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9 (as amended in
2002). See also BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE TAX LAW OF CHARITABLE GIVING 111-122 (2d ed., 2000).
43. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 41, at 1183.
44. Id. at 1184.
45. Id; see infra text accompanying notes 49-71.
46. I.R.C. § 170 (b)(1)(C)(iv).
47. Jeffrey C. McCarthy, Federal Income Taxation of Fine Art, 2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1,
42 (1983).
48. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3)(C).
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b. Quantitative Limitations
The tax consequence of labeling the work of art as (long term) capital gain
property or ordinary income property is once again generally speaking the
difference between a deduction for full fair market value versus a deduction limited
to basis. Another consequence of labeling the work of art as (long term) capital
gain property or ordinary income property is the difference in quantitative
limitations that are applicable. 49 There are two types of quantitative limitations for
charitable transfers. The first is the general percentage limitation for all transfers
made by the taxpayer to charities within that taxable year.50  The second
quantitative limitation depends on distinctions between the type of property
donated (capital gain property or ordinary income property) and the status of the
donee charity as public or private.
5 1
General Overall Percentage Limitations
The general percentage limitation for all transfers of cash and ordinary income
property in the aggregate to public charities is 50% of a donor's contribution
base. 52 A donor's contribution base is generally the donor's adjusted gross income
but without regard for any net operating loss carryback. 3
For transfers to private charities, the general percentage limit under §
170(b)(1)(B) is the lesser of (i) 30% of the contribution base, and (ii) the excess of
50% of the contribution base over the amount of charitable contributions allowable
to public charities.
5 4
Ordinary Income Property Amount Limitations
For a work of art that is ordinary income property and donated to a public or
private charity, the deduction for that item is limited to its basis.55 That deduction
amount is then subject to the overall 50% or 30% (depending on public or private
status of charity) percentage limitations. 56 Any excess amount over the 50% or
30% general percentage limitations may be carried forward for five years.
57
Capital Gain Property Amount Limitations
For a work of art that is capital gain property, satisfies the related use rule, and is
donated to a public charity, the deduction is the full fair market value of the work
49. Id. § 170(b)(1).
50. Id.
51. E.g., I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C), (D).
52. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A).
53. Id. § 170(b)(1)(F).
54. Id. §170(b)(1)(B).
55. Id. § 170(e)(l)(A).
56. Id. § 170(b)(l)(A), (B).
57. Id. § 170(d)(l)(A),(b)(1)(B).
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of art.58  This amount, however, is specifically subject to the overall 30% of
contribution base limitation.
59
If that work of art is instead donated to a private charity (but without regard to
use), the deduction is reduced by 100% of the appreciation, and thus is essentially a
deduction limited to basis. 60  It is then potentially further limited by the overall
percentage limitation to the lesser of (i) 20% of the contribution base, and (ii) the
excess of 30% of the contribution base over the charitable contribution allowable to
public charities.
61
Any excess amount over the applicable general percentage limitation may be
carried forward for five years.62
Alternative Minimum Tax Impact
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 added a wrinkle to the charitable giving of
appreciated property. From 1987 through December 31, 1990, the long-term
appreciation in the value of donated property was a tax preference item for AMT
purposes.63 After 1990, there was political, legislative and regulatory skirmishing 64
that ultimately led to the repeal of the then-subsection 57(a)(6), so that the
appreciation in the value of tangible personal property donated to a charitable
organization is no longer a tax preference item for AMT.65 Nevertheless, even
today a donor may otherwise be within the AMT snare and that, of course, will
have a quantitative impact on the tax consequences of the charitable transfer.
3. Related Use Rule
Section 170(e)(1) was amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to add another
requirement for favorable tax treatment for charitable contributions of "tangible
personal property." 66  In order to keep the deduction for full fair market value
58. Id. § 170(b)(1)(C)(i).
59. Id. There is a special election available to the donor to increase the 30% contribution base to
50%. If this election is made, however, the amount of the deduction must be reduced by the entire
amount of appreciation, thus resulting in a deduction limited to basis. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(iii), (e)(1).
60. I.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(C)(i), (e)(l)(B)(ii).
61. Id.
62. Id. § 170(d)(l)(A), (b)(l)(C)(ii), (b)(I)(D)(ii).
63. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Publ. L. No. 99-514, § 701(a), adding I.R.C. § 57(a)(6).
64. See generally DU BOFF & CAPLAN, supra note 24, at N-37-40; for the flavor of the debate, see
Helvering von Eisner, Moynihan, Art, and the AMT, 49 TAX NOTES 1579 (Dec. 31, 1990).
65. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13171(a), effective for
contributions of tangible personal property made after June 30, 1992; see also HOPKINS, supra note 42,
at 378-79.
66. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(1), amending Code § 170(e)(1) to
reduce the charitable deduction by 50% of the appreciation in value if the related use rule is not
satisfied; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(b)(2), amending Code § 170(e)(1) to limit
the amount of the deduction to basis if the related-use rule is not met by striking out the then current
40% figure. One of the goals of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was to "substantially restructure the
charitable contribution deduction." Meade Whitaker, Dealing With Outright Gifts to Charity in Kind, 30
NYU ANN. INST. FED. TAX'N 46, n.2 (1972).
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(subject to the general overall percentage limitation), of (i) capital gain property,
that is also (ii) tangible personal property, (iii) donated to a public charity, that
charity's actual use of that tangible personal property must be related "to the
purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under § 501 .67
Thus, a gift of a work of art to Loyola's D'Arcy Museum that the D'Arcy
displays publicly and prominently and uses educationally satisfies the related use
rule and could qualify for a full fair market value deduction. 68 On the other hand, a
gift of the same work of art to Loyola School of Law for its annual public interest
auction would not satisfy the related use rule and the deduction would be limited to
basis.69A donor may treat a contribution of tangible personal property to a public
charity as not being put to an unrelated use according to the regulations if:
(a) the donor establishes that the property is not in fact put to an unrelated use by the
donee, or
(b) at the time of the contribution it is reasonable to anticipate that the property will
not be put to an unrelated use by the donee. In the case of a contribution of tangible
personal property to or for the use of a museum, if the object donated is of a general
type normally retained by such museum or other museums for museum purposes, it
will be reasonable for the donor to anticipate, unless he has actual knowledge to the
contrary, that the object will not be put to an unrelated use by the donee, whether or
not the object is later sold or exchanged by the donee.
70
Written documentation of the use of such property can be critical to full
deductibility. In fact, one should request written confirmation from the public
charity not only about their "public" status, but also about their intended use for the
67. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i). See generally HOPKINS, supra note 42, at 143-45; see also Laurence
C. Zale & Philip T. Temple, Donations ofArt: They Are Not Just Appropriate for Museums, 140 TR. &
EST. 41, 43-44 (Apr. 2001).
68. The related use requirement apparently first appeared at the level of the Conference
Committee. "The House-Senate Conference Committee... in arriving at a compromise... introduced
out of the blue the concept of "related use." Robert Anthoine, Deductions for Charitable Contributions
of Appreciated Property-the Art World, 35 TAx L. REV. 239, 243 (1980). There was no House or
Senate version, no hearing, and no Treasury recommendation. See Whitaker, supra note 66, at 57. Rep.
Wilbur D. Mills (then Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee) may have provided the only
legislative intent for the provision, saying on the floor of the House:
What we are trying to say is that we will allow you to give this appreciated property and take
today's market value as a charitable deduction without any tax consequences to you whatsoever
if you give it to a charitable organization that normally would use the property for its exempt
purposes. Now, a clear case is a gift of a picture or work of sculpture, or anything of that sort, to
a museum. The question does arise with respect to a college or university as to whether or not
they are using this for their exempt purpose, whether it is used in their teaching. Of course, the
college could have a course in art, and if the gift were to be used for that purpose, it would
probably qualify as such a gift.
115 Cong. Rec. H40869 (1969).
69. HOPKINS, supra note 42, at 145.
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-4(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1994). The last sentence in subparagraph (b)
was added in the final regulation apparently in response to museum concerns that the proposed
regulation would unduly restrict a museum's ability to exchange or sell the donated works of art and
immediately reinvest the proceeds in equivalent property. Anthoine, supra note 68, at 247.
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item.71
4. Qualified Appraisal by a Qualified Appraiser
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 amended § 170(a) to require that a charitable
contribution is allowable "only if verified under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary." 72 Pursuant to this statutory authorization, final regulations were issued
on May 4, 1988, with respect to charitable transfers made after December 31,
1982. 73 The rules apply to any charitable transfer of an item of property (other than
money or publicly traded securities) the claimed value of which exceeds $5,000. 74
The $5,000 amount applies to a single item of property as well as to the aggregate
of similar items of property donated during a calendar year, such as a collection or
set of books, coins, or stamps.
75
If the $5,000 threshold is met, the substantiation requirements 76 are as follows:
1) a "qualified appraisal" by a "qualified appraiser" must be obtained for the
item; 7
7
2) a fully completed appraisal summary must be included with the tax return
claiming the deduction 78 (Form 8283 satisfies this requirement 79); and
3) specific records about the contribution must be maintained. 0
These rules are of course subject to future modifications and there are, not
surprisingly, unanswered questions and ambiguities in the rules. As a practical
matter, the most critical decision made by the taxpayer may be the choice of the
"qualified appraiser" who will actually prepare the qualified appraisal. If it is
determined that the chosen appraiser is not a "qualified appraiser," then the
taxpayer has not provided a qualified appraisal within the required time frame, and
71. Some examples of related use: Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-51-044 (Sept. 22, 1977) (lithographs to camp
for handicapped children, with instruction in art appreciation: related use); Priv.Ltr. Rul. 80-09-027
(Nov. 29, 1979) (antique car to University without related course: unrelated use); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-43-
029 (July 29, 1981) (porcelain art collection to public charity operating retirement center with purpose
of creating living environment: related use); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-08-059 (Nov. 25, 1981) (stamp collection
to college with course in engraving skills: related use); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-39-005 (June 20, 1984)
(manuscripts to University: related use); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-52-026 (Dec. 30, 1994) (violin to CRAT:
unrelated use); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-33-011 (Aug. 14, 1998) (paintings to JCC: related use). See also
Coleman v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 710 (1988) (gift of horse to American Cancer Society: unrelated
use); Jennings v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 595 (1988) (paintings to cancer center: unrelated use). See
LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 41, at 1190-91.
72. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 155.
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13 (as amended in 1996).
74. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 155(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(1) (as
amended in 1996).
75. STAFF OF JT. COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 (H.R. 4170, 98th Congress; Pub. L. No. 98-369),
at 506 (1984).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 1996).
77. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)-(c)(5).
78. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(4).
79. Id.; LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 41, at 1146.
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1996).
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no deduction is allowable.8 1  There is no objective or regulatory independent
certification process that makes an appraiser a "qualified appraiser." It is primarily
a subjective evaluation.82
C. FRACTIONAL GIFTS
1. Background
The prior discussion was premised on a transfer of the entirety of a donor's
right, title, and interest in and to the work of art to a charity. In fact, a tax lawyer's
instinct probably warns that transfers of less than everything are suspect. The Code
confirms that suspicion with its split interest rules for charitable gifts. Section
170(f)(3)(A) provides:
In the case of a contribution (not made by a transfer in trust) of an interest in property
which consists of less than the taxpayer's entire interest in such property, a deduction
shall be allowed under this section only to the extent that the value of the interest
contributed would be allowable as a deduction under this section if such interest had
been transferred in trust. For purposes of this subparagraph, a contribution by a
taxpayer of the right to use property shall be treated as a contribution of less than the
taxpayer's entire interest in such property.
83
One of the least known exceptions to this rule is for "a contribution of an
undivided portion of the taxpayer's entire interest in property." 84 This exception to
the split interest rule allows the donor to transfer an undivided, say 25%, fractional
interest in a work of art to a charity and claim a charitable deduction for the value
of that 25% interest (subject of course to the overall percentage limitation).8 5
Essentially, from the legal ownership perspective, the donor and the charity become
tenants in common. 86 From the tax perspective, how does ownership of a fractional
81. See, e.g., Bond v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 32 (1993); see also Todd v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. No. 19
(Apr. 19, 2002); Conrad Teitell, No Qualified Appraisal, No Deduction, 134 TR. & EST. 84 (Mar. 1995).
82. According to the regulations, a "qualified appraiser" is an individual who holds himself or
herself out to the public as an appraiser who is an expert as to the particular type of property being
appraised; who understands that he or she may be subject to a civil penalty under § 6701 for a false or
fraudulent statement; and who is independent of the donor. Treas. Reg. § 1 .1 70A- I 3(c)(5)(i). See also
Yvonne E. Lee, Paying the Price Under the Internal Revenue Code: For How Much Should Fine Art
Appraisers Be Liable?, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 143, 145 (1991); Jessica L. Furey, Painting a
Dark Picture: The Need for Reform of IRS Practices and Procedures Relating to Fine Art Appraisals, 9
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 177 (1990).
83. I.R.C. § 170 (f)(3)(A) (2003).
84. Id. § 170 (f)(3)(B)(ii). This exception was explicitly added by the Senate Finance Committee
to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 "to insure that [the Act] will not result in the denial of a deduction where
an outright gift is made of an undivided (e.g., one-fourth) interest in property." S. REP. No. 91-552, at
84(1969).
85. See Whitaker, supra note 66, at 80 ("A contribution of an undivided interest in a painting,
whereby the charitable donee is entitled to possession and enjoyment of the painting for part of a year is
also within the exception ....").
86. JOHN E. CRIBBETT ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY 311-12 (8th ed.
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interest in a unique work of art qualify for a current income tax deduction? The
key, according to the Treasury Regulations, is the charity's "right, as a tenant in
common with the donor, to possession, dominion, and control of the property for a
portion of each year appropriate to its interest in such property." 87 Whether this
right has in fact been transferred would seem to require at least three layers of
analysis: a conveyancing test, a whole document approach, and an operational
analysis.
8 8
The conveyancing test requires that the actual deed of transfer conforms to the
basic statutory requirements. Here that is a transfer of an "undivided portion of the
taxpayer's entire interest." If the deed specifically reserves to the taxpayer the
exclusive right to sell the entire work, then it fails the conveyancing test.
The second level of analysis is the whole document approach. If the basic
transfer meets the conveyancing test, then one needs to read the entire rest of the
document with a critical eye. Is there anything in the rest of the document that
could be seen as undercutting the actual conveyance? For example, would a
requirement of the charity's giving six months notice in order to exercise its right
of possession, compromise its rights as a tenant in common?
Finally, if the written document is clean, one needs an operational analysis to
consider how this transfer will actually work. In short, there can be nothing that
will indirectly defeat the rights transferred. For example, in Winokur v.
Commissioner,8 9 the Tax Court held that it was the charity's legal right to have
physical possession of the works of art, not the charity's actual physical possession,
that is the controlling factor. Nevertheless, the Court made it clear that the
charity's failure to demand actual physical possession was "voluntary" on its part
and not caused by any act of the taxpayer. 90 Moreover, "the evidence does not
indicate that any side agreement existed between petitioner and the Carnegie
Institute to the effect that the Carnegie Institute would not take possession of the
works of art for the portion of each year represented by its partial ownership
interests therein."
91
2. Uses of Fractional Dispositions to Charity
At this point, one may wonder what would compel a collector to give up fee
simple absolute to become a tenant in common with a public charity? There are
two primary scenarios (one qualitative, and the other quantitative) where fractional
gifting is appropriate. In each case tax incentives certainly play an important role,
2002).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(b)(l)(i) (as amended in 1994).
88. This three-layered analysis is one way to think about the concrete meaning of Code statutory
requirements such as "directly or indirectly," or the actual application of an overall notion of "form and
substance." It has proved a useful template for students in drafting exercises. I, however, specifically
do not claim authorship for this approach; nor can I give an appropriate citation. Like air, its origins are
obscured by time.
89. 90 T.C. 733 (1988).
90. Id. at 740.
91. Id. at n.4.
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although it is worth noting that the collector is generally also predisposed to
charitable giving.
92
a. Quality of Life Example
Quite simply, a collector may not want to give up the lifetime possession of a
work of art if she enjoys its presence in her home. Her will bequeaths the
appreciated work of art purchased by her husband and her years ago to an art
museum that is a public charity. By transferring an undivided 25% fractional
interest to the museum now, she can receive a current income tax deduction for that
25% interest and she is entitled to retain possession for 9 months out of the year.
93
If the taxpayer normally spends time each year at another home, her actual loss of
enjoyment may be minimal (assuming the museum in fact exercises its right to
physical possession of the work of art).
b. Percentage Limitation Example
The collector decides to transfer an appreciated work of art that he purchased
many years ago to an art museum that is a public charity. Its value is $1,500,000;
the collector's AGI is $500,000. The maximum deduction is $150,000 (30% of
$500,000) for the year of transfer and for each of the succeeding 5 years.9 4 The
total maximum deduction therefore is $900,000. In order to receive the full tax
deduction of $1,500,000, the donor could transfer a 60% fractional interest in year
one and then in year seven, transfer the remaining 40% (assuming values held
constant). By using two fractional gifts, the full $1,500,000 of charitable deduction
is available over a 10 year span and none of it is lost due to the general percentage
limitation.
While gifts of undivided fractional interests in property generally raise the
(happy) possibility of discounts for transfer tax purposes, 95 apparently the IRS
position is to accept as the income tax charitable deduction for a fractional interest
in works of art the undivided percentage interest of the work's fair market value.
96
This pro-rata position may be historically based on an example provided in
Revenue Ruling 57-293. 97
92. Many professionals involved with charitable giving recognize that major donors generally
have a connection with, or affection for, a particular institution or cause, and that is, in general, the
prompting motivation for a significant gift. Tax concerns, however, can dictate the structure of a
particular donative transfer. See, e.g., Craig Wruck, Nat'l Com. Planned Giving White Paper: Estate
Tax Repeal and Charitable Giving (2000).
93. See supra text accompanying note 85.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
95. See, e.g., Propstra v. U.S., 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982); but cf Young Est. v. Comm'r, 110
T.C. 297 (1998).
96. Note, Contribution of Partial Interest to Charity, 52 J. TAx'N 112 (1980); see also Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 93-03-007 (Jan. 22, 1993).
97. Rev. Rul. 57-293, 1957-2 C.B. 153. (N.B. Part of this ruling is out of date due to changes in
I.R.C. § 170(f).) This approach is, however, consistent with the long-held IRS view that "in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the fact that the interest involved is a fractional interest does not warrant any
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More recently in Private Letter Ruling 9303007, the Service continued this
proportionate valuation approach even though the donor in that case had a
possibility of reverter if certain conditions concerning display and publicity were
not followed. 98 The Service determined that those conditions had no effect on
value since the possibility of reverter was so remote as to be negligible.
99
III. VALUATION
The valuation of unique works of art is difficult, 00 and whether for tax reasons
or non-tax reasons, there is no doubt that it must depend on expert appraisals by
expert appraisers.101 The general valuation rule of fair market value applies,' °2 but
its application to works of art has at least two procedural twists.
discount, i.e. the value of such interest is equivalent to the proportionate part of the value of the entire
interest." Michael F. Beausang, 830 BNA T.M., Valuation: General and Real Estate A-23 (Oct. 22,
2001).
98. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-007, supra note 96.
99. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-02-032 (Oct. 26, 2001); cf. Estate of Scull v. Comm'r, 67 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2953 (1994), where the Tax Court allowed a five percent (5%) discount for a 65% undivided
interest in art that was bequeathed to an individual.
100. The truth of this obvious statement seems neatly captured by an oft repeated telling of an
auction involving a Rembrandt etching. At a May 1973 auction in New York, two impressions of the
same Rembrandt etching were sold, one for $3,600.00 and the other for $70,000.00, a price that is
almost twenty times higher. The $70,000.00 etching was an early impression and the less expensive one
was a restrike pulled after the plate was wom. Speiller supra note 30, at 228.
The difficulty of valuation is not a new issue. See Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 C.B. 1257, as an initial
attempt by IRS to address the importance of appraisals in the valuation of works of art; Marie Garibaldi,
Some Final Problems for the Charitable Taxpayer: Gift Annuities; Pooled Income Funds; Split
Interests; Valuation of Charitable Gifts, 30 NYU ANN. INST. FED. TAX'N 117, 153 (1972) ("Another
very difficult valuation problem is the determination of the fair market value of an object of art."). Nor
is it an issue that will likely disappear. A quick comparison of auction house pre-auction estimates with
the actual sales prices at auction confirms this ongoing difficulty under arguably the best of
circumstances. Christie's recently placed a pre-auction estimate of $9-13.5 million for Picasso's "Nu au
Collier" (Nude with a Necklace). It sold at auction for $23.97 million on June 25, 2002. Picasso
Painting Sells for $24 Million, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2002, at § 1, 6. Aside from the overvaluation present
in the early "tax shelters," as discussed supra, at text accompanying notes 22-25, another unsavory
aspect of the valuation difficulty is the predatory use of false valuations for the expert appraiser's
personal benefit. Philadelphia antiques dealer Russell Pritchard III recently pleaded guilty to charges of
defrauding artifact owners by giving low appraisals on items, then reselling the artifacts at much higher
prices, making between $800,000.00 and $1,500,000.00 on the fraudulent transactions. Antiques Dealer
Finedfor Fake Appraisals, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 2002, at § 1, 13.
Even in the hypothetical world of a US wealth tax, the difficulty of valuing "the proverbial
Rembrandt in the vault" is noted, although the authors' overall impression is that only a medium degree
of difficulty in valuation would occur. David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax,
53 TAX L. REv. 607, 612 (2000). This assessment did not go unchallenged. James R. Repetti, It's All
About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 607, 612 (2000).
101. For a charitable deduction for income tax purposes of a work of art exceeding $5,000.00 in
value, of course, a qualified appraisal by a qualified appraiser is one requirement. See supra text
accompanying notes 72-82.
102. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6, 25.2512-1, 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1996).
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A. ART ADVISORY PANEL
Ever since 1968, there has been an Art Advisory Panel of the Commissioner.10 3
The Panel is appointed by the Commissioner and is now composed of 25 persons,
drawn from art dealers, museum curators, and auction house experts.' 04 It meets
generally twice a year in closed door sessions to review the appraisals submitted by
taxpayers with their income, estate, or gift tax returns. 10 5 The panel is not told
whether the appraisal is for income or transfer tax purposes. 0 6 All taxpayer cases
selected for audit which include works of art with a claimed value of $20,000 or
more must be sent to the National Office Art Appraisal Service for review by the
Commissioner's Art Advisory Panel.1
0 7
In 2000, the Panel reviewed a staggering total of 2,546 items with a taxpayer
claimed value of $266,541,577 on 79 taxpayer returns. 10 8  For charitable
contributions for income tax purposes, deductions claimed by taxpayers totaled
$1,734,288.09 The Panel's aggregate recommendation was $477,250, or
approximately a 75% reduction in the overvalued items for charitable
contributions.'"0 For estate and gift tax returns (referencing 2533 items), the
taxpayers claimed value was $264,807,289.11' The Panel's recommendation was
$337,454,635, or a 47% increase on the undervalued items for transfer tax
purposes.11
2
Interestingly for 2001, the Panel reviewed a significantly lower 1 3 number of
items (687) with an equally lower taxpayer claimed value of $114,951,036 in 89
taxpayer returns. Equally interesting, however, was the dramatic increase in the
percent of taxpayer valuations that were accepted by the Panel. For the income tax
103. I.R.S. News Release, IR-68 (Feb. 1, 1968); see also Maurice F. O'Connell, Defending Art
Valuations for Tax Purposes, 115 TR. & EST. 604 (1976) (briefly outlining the beginning and early
operations of the Art Advisory Panel). The creation of the Art Advisory Panel may have been an art
world attempt at self-policing or perhaps even self-preservation in light of abusive valuations.
"Pressures evolving in the art world caused the American Association of Art Museum Directors to
suggest creation of an art advisory panel. The art museum directors were concerned with the rise in
grossly inflated appraisals of art works that were donated to charitable institutions during the early
1960's. These inflated appraisals reached such epidemic proportions that Congress considered
removing art donations from the tax exemption list." McCarthy, supra note 47, at 15.
104. 1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT (CCH) 42(16) 4.1. See also Furey, supra note 82,
at 182.
105. Art Advisory Panel of the Commissioner of Intemal Revenue, ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT
FOR 2001 (Closed Meeting Activity).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Of the 13 items reviewed, 2 valuations were accepted as filed, and Il were adjusted
downward.
111. Id.
112. Id. Of the 2,518 items reviewed, 1,551 (61%) were accepted as filed, and 967 (38%) were
adjusted. Of those 967 items, 919 (36%) were adjusted upward and 48 (2%) were adjusted downward.
113. From the nature of the raw data, it is purely speculative as to why there was such a drop. A
recent Wall Street Journal article suggested that museums are getting choosier about accepting works of
art. Brooks Barnes, Take My Art - Please, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2002, at W 14.
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charitable contributions, the Panel accepted 63% of the taxpayer valuations in 2001
compared to 14% in 2000.114
B. ADVANCE VALUATION RULING PROCEDURE
As part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, the House and Senate
Conference Committee expressed its intent that the Secretary of the Treasury will
report to Congress on the development of a procedure for a taxpayer to obtain an
advance ruling on the value of tangible personal property for income tax purposes
before the charitable contribution.' 1 5 An advance procedure has not yet truly been
developed.
The Service, however, did issue Revenue Procedure 96-15.116 A taxpayer can
now request a Statement of Value for income tax purposes a work of art (1) after
the transfer to a charitable organization, but prior to the filing of the income tax
return reporting the transfer, (2) with the submission of a qualified appraisal and
payment of the user fee ($2,500 for one, two or three items plus $250 for each
additional item), and (3) for an item of art that has been appraised at $50,000 or
more. 117 Revenue Procedure 96-15 also applies to transfers for estate and gift tax
purposes, including transfers to individuals as well as charities.''
8
IV. CONCLUSION
This brief synopsis of the income tax treatment for dispositions of works of art
demonstrates that art is, in fact, accorded special treatment in the Code. This
special treatment, however, is not easily categorized as positive or negative. Sales
of works of art can qualify to use the preferred capital gains rate structure in
computing the tax, and not the higher, ordinary income rates. Yet, sales of other
kinds of property can qualify for capital gains rates even lower than that mandated
for works of art as "collectibles gain."
Similarly, a charitable donation of a work of art can, in fact, qualify for a full
fair-market value charitable deduction for income tax purposes. Yet the
requirements for the property, the donee, the use, and the procedural requirements
of a qualified appraisal by a qualified appraiser are significantly beyond what many
other charitable donations require.
The current Code represents a pragmatic balance and is reminiscent of Justice
Holmes's "bad man" of the law. 119 Society's decision to promote and preserve the
114. Art Advisory Panel of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ANNUAL SUMMARY REPORT
FOR 2000 (Closed Meeting Activity).
115. H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 561 (1993).
116. Rev. Proc. 96-15, 1996-1 C.B. 627.
117. Id.
118. As of year end, there have only been a dozen or so requests made by taxpayers pursuant to
Rev. Proc. 96-15. HOPKINS, supra note 42, at 372: "Why would someone engage in this process?...
Only the most cautious will utilize this process .... "
119. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897) ("If
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man .... ").
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soaring good of cultural property is advanced by the Code but not nafvely. Current
and future promotion and protection of cultural property is and must be tempered
with a realistic assessment of the fiscal temptations that some would illicitly
exploit. And for that, even the Code has a role to play.
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